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VIA PACIS 



FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 

CONCERNING 

"How Terms of Peace 
CAN BE Automatically Prepared 
While the War is Still Going On'' 




A SUGGESTION 

OFFERED BY AN AMERICAN 

HAROLD F. M<:CORMICK 



ZURICH 

CONCILIUM BIBLIOORAPHICUM 

1917 



J 






By trnnsfer 
Department of Stat 

1319. 






In writing the pamphlet "Via Pacis", I took pains 
to avoid entering into discussions concerning the 
present war, merely presenting in generic terms a 
method for hastening the termination of warfare in 
any conflict that might be under consideration. I now 
venture to depart for a moment from this distant 
attitude and to explain my convictions regarding 
the applicability of the system to the war now in 
progress. For this purpose 1 now offer: 

1. An analysis of "Via Pacis" in the light of the 
Present Situation, 

2. A suggested sketch of "Stepping Stones" for 
putting the plan into operation, 

3. A refutation of certain criticisms of "Via Pacis", 

4. An appendix containing public utterances of inter- 
est in this connection. 



ANALYSIS OF "VIA PACIS" IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE PRESENT SITUATION. 

Already in the early months of the present year, 
the act of communicating peace notes and replies 



thereto involved the recognition on the part of 
all belligerents of features adopted in "Via Pads". 
These were: 

1. Employment of neutrals as transfer agents, 
rather than as possible mediators. 

2. Employment of the method of direct com- 
munications to be subn?itted to the opponent. 

3. Publicity of intercourse. 

The Entente in replying to President Wilson 
committed itself at least to a: 

4. Statement of general aims. 

The Central Powers (replying to President Wilson) 
were even also willing to accept: 

5. Direct exchange of terms in precise and 
concrete form. 

The neutrals also showed complete readiness to 
play the: 

6. Static Role of transfer agents and in general 
proclaimed their desire to know the terms 
of each side. 

The essential points of divergence between the 
two groups of belligerents concern four features: 

1 . Duration of the war, the Entente standing for con- 
tinuance, the Central Powers for cessation, 

2. Unity of action, the Entente adopting joint notes, 
the Central Powers making use of separate notes, 

3. Negotiation, rejected by the Entente, solicited by 
the Central Powers, 

4. Immediate exchange of complete and precise 
terms, by inference distasteful to the Entente, 



desired by the Central Powers (witness the attitude 
of the Entente towards Germany's announcement 
that she had terms ready for presentation at the 
peace conference). 

The compromise character of "Via Pacis" is well 
shown by the fact that each side would secure its 
wish in certain points, making concessions on others. 
The Entente would win: 

1. continuance of the war, 

2. unity of action, 

3. elimination of negotiation; 
The Central Powers would win: 

4. immediate mutual exchange of precise terms. 
To my mind "Via Pacis" ought to be at least as 

acceptable to the Entente as to the Central Powers. 

"Via Pacis" contains two advantages not found 
in the propositions thus far put forward by the gov- 
ernments, but profitable to both sides: 

1. Possibility to amend (if desired) terms submitted, 
keeping them valid up to date. 

2. Possibility of demanding further elucidation of 
terms submitted, thus attaining precision and parity. 

These features tend to throw automatically into 
the background and eliminate points of agreement 
and to correspondingly concentrate all attention upon 
the points in conflict. Thus a process of adjustment 
would ensue, tending to approximate more and more 
the respective terms and to reduce the disputed ele- 
ments to the fewest number. The flexibility of the 
system is thus complete. 



It may be said that the replies of the belligerents 
to President Wilson constitute the recognition of the 
adversary in his claim for enlightenment as well as 
of the neutral in his role as custodian of peace terms, 
as proposed in "Via Pacis", but fall short by implying 
that the statements were destined for the information 
of the neutral, rather than for transmission to the 
opponent. 

"Via Pacis" suggests a technique as to "ways 
and means", to which President Wilson referred as 
being immaterial to him. It has the same aim in 
view (enunciation of terms) that formed the basis of 
Mr. Lansing's note of Dec. 18^^, 1916. The broad 
principles proclaimed by the President would find 
expression in the successive amendments of the depos- 
ited peace terms and, so far as they found accept- 
ance by both sides, would appear in the prevalence 
of greater harmony in the respective statements. For 
the time being, mediation seems to find no favor. 
In "Via Pacis", the belligerents begin to deal directly 
with each other and the heated discussions concerning 
the settlement would be effectively disposed of. 

Let us now consider in the light of recent events 
from which side the suggestion that the method of 
"Via Pacis" be introduced might fitly come. The 
Entente Powers having stated their "aims" in coope- 
rative response to President Wilson's invitation, cer- 
tainly have ground to feel that no such overture 
should come from them. The unrestrained submarine 
policy leading to rupture with America was proclaimed 
shortly after President Wilson's invitation and since 
then the war has continued even more vigorously 



than before, with a corresponding cessation of the 
exchange of notes concerning peace, at least until 
the recent utterances of the Pope. The Entente 
thus stands on record before the world as having 
formulated, at least in general terms, its aims, with 
the moral advantage thereby attained. Germany made 
the first public overture, but she did not follow her 
step to its logical conclusion. She stated she had 
her terms prepared, but did not make them known, 
nor has she met the announcement of the aims of 
the Entente by any equivalent declaration. 

Whilst thus it is clearly fitting in the chronology 
of the situation, that the Central Powers should make 
the first move, we should not forget that they would 
scarcely feel inclined to desire "Via Pacis" so long as 
they hoped for a crushing military victory, for a 
separate peace with Russia or for an acceptance of a 
conference with peace negotiations. Also any internal 
want of unanimity or any disagreement between the 
Central Powers as to peace terms must offer a hindrance 
to the adoption of ''Via Pacis". 

Should these obstacles be cleared away, it might 
be a most opportune and effective act for the Central 
Powers to propose some such plan as "Via Pacis" 
for adoption by mutual assent. In accepting, the 
Entente would be favoring a belligerent, not a pacifist 
idea and would give no impression of v/eakness. It 
would merely establish, for both sides, what is now 
missing, a line of contact in the matter of mutual 
understanding of peace terms, while the war goes on. 
We know that the proposal follows the spirit of 
President Wilson's note. His note was, it is true, 



written before America declared war; but we may 
certainly assume that his ideals have undergone no 
essential change and that such a proposal might to-day 
find favor in his eyes. 



SUGGESTED SKETCH OF 

STEPPING STONES FOR PUTTING 

"VIA PACIS" INTO OPERATION 

1. Consideration and decision by the allies whether 
"Via Pacis" would be a practical proposition. 

2. Consideration and decision as to how it would 
be put into operation. 

(My view respectfully submitted is that the pro- 
posal should come from the Central Powers.) 

1. With a tacit understanding in advance as 
to its acceptance or 

2. Without such understanding. 

3. Acceptance by both sides. 

4. Decision as to whether public announcement 
of the decision to adopt "Via Pacis" be made 
and as to whether public announcement of terms 
should later be made. 

5. Neutral countries to be selected as custodians. 

6. Acceptance by these neutral countries of their part. 

7. Date set for first deposit of terms (decision as to 
intervals between and dates for any succeeding 
set of terms optionally put out by either side). 



8. Conferences by affiliated nations of each side to 
formulate respective sets of terms. 

9 Deposit of original documents of terms with 
neutral nations - they to forward copies to 
respective belligerents. (First sets of^ terms would 
naturally comprise only "demands".) 

10 "Via Pacis" then in operation - changes in 
terms if any subject to future desire. (Concessions 
made as desired, after review by each side of 
-demands" by other side, taken into considera- 
tion with his own situation.) 



REFUTATION OF CRITICISMS 
OF 'VIA PACIS" 

1. "It is too practical, too commercial". 

To my mind, almost everything in this war 
has for purposes of efficiency been reduced 
to a business basis: men, money, supplies, 
manouvers, care of the wounded, etc. There is 
no reason why terms involving, not commer- 
cial, but high humanitarian considerations could 
not' before hand find voice in the peace terms 
provided for by "Via Pacis", just as readily 
as they could later be embodied in the final 
Peace Protocol. At some time the formulation 
would have to be made. The statement of 
terms, as 1 conceive it, might include matters 
of the highest ethical plane, where no taint 
of „commercialism" could possibly prevail. 



2. "It is too ideal, too naive". 

"Via Pacis" is only a method, a tool. In 
the hand of the statesman, it can be made to 
respond to his calm foresight and to the results 
of his cold calculations. Once in operation it 
has all the security of a world-wide pledge, with 
all neutral countries as witnesses (so far as the 
feature of publicity is adopted). The terms may 
be maintained high or reduced, just as practical 
policies may counsel, with no time limit. 

3. "It is a peace plan". 

Every war measure has as its object the 
attainment of peace. In this sense, Haig and 
Hindenburg are each working on a "peace plan", 
as truly as would "Via Pacis". For all that, 
"Via Pacis" is no pacifist scheme. The pam- 
phlet might perhaps have fitly borne the title: 
— "Via Pacis or Effective Warfare''. In truth, 
it is the attempt to secure early recognition 
for military ascendency in war. Through its 
emphasis on potential strength, it may be said 
that not merely the armies now in the field, 
but also the reservoirs of untrained men and 
greater battles than any yet fought are thown 
into the scale-pan of war. The only thing sought 
by "Via Pacis" is to secure at the earliest 
possible moment that outcome of the struggle 
which the relative forces available make inevi- 
table. It endeavors to accomplish this by straight 
forward means, casting off the trammels of 
traditional diplomacy. 



'Concessions made would show weakness". 

The strength of one side need not be weak- 
ened by "concessions" made, any more than 
would be inevitably revealed by the war and 
economic status. On the other hand, the baro- 
meter of strength would be officially and for- 
mally presented and shown by the demands 
appearing alongside the concessions, and the 
positive story told by the former would offset 
any negative impression left by the latter. In- 
deed the concessions would be made merely 
to eliminate the elements upon which agree- 
ment was possible and so to lay especial 
emphasis upon the demands maintained. Even 
according to the alternative plan of peace nego- 
tiations, each side would come to the conference 
table prepared to make some concessions, as 
surely as if they were made in due course under 
the working of "Via Pacis". In effect, the past 
period has reduced and absorbed demands pre- 
viously put forth. This revision has been a 
consequence of the war itself. "Via Pacis" only 
systemizes this process and renders it efficient. 
Concessions under "Via Pacis" involve nothing 
more, but are more advantageous to the granter 
than later concessions, in that a saving may be 
secured by the shortening of the war. So the 
"net" result would be a gain. 

ZURICH, September 15th, 1917. 



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APPENDIX 

VARIOUS PUBLIC UTTERANCES 

Mr. BALFOUR:— "How can anyone go into the details and 
know in advance the work to be done by the peace conference, 
which will bring about the finish of this war? Every declaration 
made by a responsible Minister is looked at as the precise 
and detailed plan, on which the Government will act, when 
the moment for the final settlement has come. This is a 
very dangerous way to treat such kind of declaration. One 
cannot treat such problems with the same spirit of precision, 
as one can treat historical problems of the past. Nobody 
can foresee the condition in which the world will be at the 
moment, when these problems are to be decided upon. Dare 
you ask me now to take the risks which may be caused by 
giving details on these questions of utmost importance ? He, 
who would try to do this now, would render a very bad 
service to his country". 

(Upon the present basis Mr. Balfour is logical. Upon 
the basis of "Via Pacis", this objection would not exist. The 
purpose of everybody would then be to do this very thing.) 

Premier RIBOT:— "What does the Chancellor want? He 
is endeavoring to dissimulate the difficulty he experiences in 
defining the war objects of Germany and the conditions on 
which she will make peace". 

Mr.BONAR LAW:— "We have already declared our objects 
of war, but Germany has never done anything of the kind. 
Why not? Because the moment her conditions of peace 
should be formulated in writing, she would be unmasked". 



11 



LE MATIN: — "The crisis continues because the Kaiser, 
the Crown Prince and the government are more than ever 
determined not to state clearly the war aims of the Central 
Powers". 

DAS FREMDENBLATT (Vienna):— ''The time is past 
when the aims of war of the Central Powers, inspired as they 
are by a spirit of conciliation, can be distorted and obscured". 

Father VAUGHAN :—" The Papal note will in fact induce 
the belligerent nations to proclaim with greater charness and 
precision the conditions of peace of each side". 

Mrs. Fannie Fern ANDREWS, Member of the Executive 
Committee of the Central Organisation for a durable peace, 
Boston, U. S. A. :— "The [German] Government may be forced 
to state definite peace terms. The opinion is pretty general 
here that the next step in this direction should be taken by 
Germany". 



President WILSON:— "We must await some new 
evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the 
Central Empires. God grant it may be given soon, and 
in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples every- 
where in the faith of the nations and the possibility of 
a covenanted peace". 



LiBRftRY OF CONGRESS 
Q 020 934 761 1 



